Enough already with the “Bush Lied” claims. From both sides! From any number of Democrats who continue in
their attempts to rewrite history in an effort to make it appear as if they knew
all along that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, to many in
the current field of Republican 2016 candidates, and soon to be candidates, who
appear to be only too eager to throw George W. Bush under the bus in what, I
guess, is an effort to make it appear as if ‘they’ would have never taken the
nation to war in the first place. Look,
there is plenty of criticism that can be leveled against George W. Bush’s
decision to invade Iraq in 2003, but the one critique that simply does not hold
water is that he somehow deliberately mislead (lied to) the country about Iraq
possessing weapons of mass destruction.
With the new cool question to ask any of the Republican
2016 contenders, and even perspective contenders, now being, “knowing what we
know now, would you have invaded Iraq,” the debate about pre-Iraq war
intelligence has once again come to the forefront. Predictably, some liberals have used the
occasion to again trot out the wholly dishonest spin that the Bush administration
concocted evidence and pressured the intelligence community into saying that
Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. Here’s Peter Beinart, someone known for being
an American political pundit and who actually supported the Iraq war, has been busying
himself propagating this sort of idiotic drivel most recently courtesy of a
piece in ‘The Atlantic’. According to
Mr. Beinart:
“To understand how ludicrous that position is, it’s
worth remembering a few things. First, the evidence that Iraq had weapons of
mass destruction was extremely weak. Yes, the U.S. government in October 2002
produced a National Intelligence Estimate that appeared to suggest Iraq had
chemical and biological weapons and a nuclear-weapons program. But a 2004
Senate review concluded that “most of the major key judgments in the
Intelligence Community’s October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) …
either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence
reporting.” The NIE, which was produced under intense pressure from White House
and Pentagon officials seeking a justification for war, painted a far more
menacing picture of Iraq’s WMD programs than had previous U.S. assessments. As
the head of British intelligence famously remarked, “intelligence and facts
were being fixed around the policy.” The unclassified summary of the NIE was
also far more categorical than the full, classified version, which, according
to Florida Senator Bob Graham, was “pocked with dissent, conditions, [and]
minority opinions on a variety of critical issues.” After reading the full NIE,
Graham voted against authorizing war. Unfortunately, by one estimate, only a
half-dozen other senators bothered to do so.”
Now if any of this was true that would be one thing,
but there is very little, if any, truth in any of Beinart’s rather idiotic rant. It is little more than one man’s purposeful
attempt to recast past events so as to more favorably agree with Democrat
rhetoric, to rewrite history in such a way as to create the perception, at least,
that the rationale for going into Iraq was based on nothing more than a lie of
the worst kind and perpetrated by Bush and others in his administration. But let’s not forget the fact that Democrats
dating back to the Clinton administration also believed that Iraq had
stockpiles of WMDs based on the intelligence they saw. But the evidence against this lie is so much
greater than that. And the debunking of this recurring myth has been underway
now for a number of years. For instance:
1.) Read the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on
Iraq’s W.M.D programs. “Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as
missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it
probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade,” the report reads. The
report goes on to say it has “high confidence” that “Iraq possesses proscribed
chemical and biological weapons and missiles” and “Iraq could make a nuclear
weapon in months to a year once it acquires sufficient weapons-grad fissile
material.”
2.) Read Bob Woodard’s account of then-CIA
director’s George Tenet’s briefing of the George W. Bush on the eve of the Iraq
war. According to the Washington Post journalist, Tenet told Bush that it was a
“slam dunk case” that Iraq had W.M.D.s. Tenet later said he was taken out of
context, but that doesn’t seem to be the case and, in any event, Tenet doesn’t
deny he was fundamentally confident that Iraq possessed W.M.D.s.
3.) General Tommy Franks, who led the invasion of
Iraq in 2003, writes in his book that he was not only told by Egyptian and
Jordanian leaders that Iraq possessed W.M.D.s, he was also told that Saddam
would use them against invading American troops.
4.) Former CIA agent Kenneth Pollock has noted that
the world’s most vaunted intelligence agencies, including some of those who
opposed the war in Iraq, all believed Saddam Hussein possessed W.M.D.s. These
include the intelligence agencies of Germany, Israel, Russia, Britain, China
and France.
5.) As Barry “Almighty” contemplated whether to authorize
the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, he was told by CIA Deputy Director Mike
Morell that the evidence indicating that Iraq had W.M.D.s before the Iraq war
was “much stronger” than the evidence that bin Laden was living in the
Abbottabad compound. “And I’m telling you, the case for W.M.D. wasn’t just
stronger—it was much stronger,” he told the president.
In fact, Morell recently published a book where he
reiterates the aforementioned point and emphatically states that the Bush
administration did not pressure the CIA whatsoever to conclude there were WMDs
in Iraq. A book in which he writes: “The view that hardliners in the Bush
administration forced the intelligence community into its position on WMD is
just flat wrong.” And he goes on to say,
“No one pushed. The analysts were already there and they had been there for
years, long before Bush came to office.”
Which oddly enough, or maybe not so oddly, is similar to the conclusion
of 2005’s bipartisan Robb-Silberman Commission.
The report states, “[W]e closely examined the possibility that
intelligence analysts were pressured by policymakers to change their judgments
about Iraq’s nuclear, biological, chemical weapons programs.”
It’s this very same report also goes on to say, “The
analysts who worked Iraqi weapons issues universally agreed that in no instance
did political pressure cause them to skew or alter any of their analytical
judgments.” And in going back to
Morell’s book, he writes, “An NIE represents the authoritative view of the
entire intelligence community on an issue. They are carefully considered. The
coordination sessions among the analysts are rigorous and NIEs are approved by
the leadership of each agencies in the community.” As for the conclusions laid out in the NIE
that Iraq had stockpiles of WMDs, “there was little
controversy” within the
intelligence community, Morell continued.
And in his book Morell says, “One agency, the State
Department’s intelligence shop, dissented on one aspect of the paper, the
nuclear question, but agreed on all others because almost everyone who had
looked at the issue — from intelligence services around the world to think
tanks and the United Nations itself — had come to the same conclusion,” he went
on. “There were no outliers, no group with a different view. No one to force a
broader debate that might have led to a more rigorous assessment on the part of
the analysts. Group think turned out to be part of the problem.” And Beinart, in referring to the Downing
Street Memo, mentions that a British analyst argued in 2002 that “intelligence
and facts were being fixed around the policy” of removing Saddam Hussein from
power. But even that’s not much of a leg
to stand on.
So criticize Bush’s decision to go into Iraq all you
want. But the evidence was what it was. Our intelligence community got it wrong
about Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction. Bush didn’t lie, nor did his
administration pressure the intelligence community into concluding what it said
about WMDs. And wouldn’t it be nice if I
could say, and with some confidence, that it was only those on the left who
can’t seem to stop falsifying history.
Sadly, it’s also many on our side who are also revisionists in their own
way, apparently in the hope of scoring some cheap political points as they go
about trying to convince the American people of their viability. Which, and I hate to disappoint them, does
absolutely nothing to convince me that I should vote for any of these pathetic
political opportunists.
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